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Non-technical Summary
Patenting is widely acknowledged as a major tool to reward innovative firms
for their efforts in research and development (R&D). However, many firms
decide to keep their inventions secret. Understanding a patent according to
the original sense of patent law, it basically has two functions: The first is to
mitigate the problem of unintended spillover of R&D outcomes by providing
an effective tool of temporary knowledge protection. This protective effect
of a patent enables the inventor to appropriate the returns from his research
efforts. The second function of a patent is to contribute to the diffusion of
(new) knowledge by requiring the disclosure of the invention to society.
Most of the economic literature implicitly assumes that the disclosure require-
ment has no impact on the protective effect of a patent and consequently on
the propensity to patent. Or more precisely it is assumed that the disclosure
requirement is only effective after a patent’s expiry. This implies that the use
of the disclosed invention for subsequent innovation is strongly limited dur-
ing the patent term. But this approach neglects the possibility of inventing
around the precedent invention and entering the market with an improved –
and oftentimes even non-infringing – product.
In this paper we take a closer look at the disclosure effect and analyze whether
firms take it into account when deciding between patenting and keeping se-
cret. Assuming that competitors may benefit from the disclosed information
in different ways we want to answer the question how the extent of the dis-
closure effect influences an innovator’s propensity to patent. To this end, we
present a theoretical model and test its predictions empirically. The main
theoretical and empirical result of this paper is that the disclosure effect of
patenting plays a substantial role in firms’ patenting decision in that a higher
impact of the disclosure effect decreases the firms’ propensity to patent.
This topic also has a policy dimension. If policymakers decide to implement
some changes to patent law which would result in strengthening the disclo-
sure effect of patenting, e.g. by implementing or extending a research use
exemption, such actions should take into account that this could cause an
increasing reluctance of firms to patent. Hence, more newly created knowl-
edge would be kept secret. This may have further detrimental effects on the
economy’s overall innovativeness and future productivity.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Hauptfunktion von Patenten ist, innovative Unternehmen fu¨r ihre For-
schungsta¨tigkeit zu entlohnen. Allerdings wird beobachtet, dass Unternehmen
ihre Erfindungen ha¨ufig geheim halten. Versteht man ein Patent im ur-
spru¨nglichen Sinne, so hat es im Wesentlichen zwei Funktionen: Die erste ist,
dass das Patent ein effektives Mittel ist, um fu¨r eine gewisse Zeit Imitationen
zu unterbinden. Diese Schutzwirkung eines Patents versetzt den Erfinder
in die Lage, sich die (moneta¨ren) Ru¨ckflu¨sse aus seiner Forschungsta¨tigkeit
anzueignen. Die zweite Funktion eines Patents ist es, durch Offenlegung der
Erfindung zur Wissensdiffusion beizutragen.
Ein Großteil der Literatur nimmt implizit an, dass die Offenlegungspflicht
keinen Einfluss auf den Schutzeffekt eines Patentes hat und somit auch keinen
Effekt auf die Patentneigung. Oder pra¨ziser formuliert, sie nimmt an, dass
die Offenlegungspflicht nur nach dem Ablauf des Patentschutzes wirksam
wird. Dies impliziert, dass wa¨hrend der Patentlaufzeit die Nutzung von of-
fengelegten Erfindungen fu¨r nachgelagerte Innovationen stark eingeschra¨nkt
ist. Dieser Ansatz vernachla¨ssigt aber die Mo¨glichkeit des“Inventing Around”
und damit des Marktzutritts mit einem verbesserten Produkts, das oft sogar
das Patent nicht verletzt.
In diesem Papier betrachten wir den Offenlegungseffekt na¨her und unter-
suchen, ob die Unternehmen diesen in Betracht ziehen, wenn sie sich zwis-
chen Patentieren und Geheimhaltung entscheiden. Da Wettbewerber auf
unterschiedliche Weise von der offengelegten Information profitieren ko¨nnen,
wollen wir die Frage beantworten, wie das Ausmaß des Offenlegungseffekts
die Patentneigung eines Unternehmens beeinflusst. Wir pra¨sentieren ein the-
oretisches Modell und testen seine Vorhersagen empirisch. Das wesentliche
Ergebnis der theoretischen und empirischen Untersuchungen ist, dass die
Offenlegungspflicht eine wichtige Rolle in der Patententscheidung von Un-
ternehmen spielt, indem ein sta¨rkerer Einfluss des Offenlegungseffekts die
Patentneigung senkt.
Dieses Thema hat auch eine politische Dimension. Sollten Entscheidungstra¨ger
A¨nderungen am Patentgesetz vornehmen wollen, die zu einer Sta¨rkung des
Offenlegungseffektes fu¨hren wu¨rden, z.B. durch die Einfu¨hrung oder den Aus-
bau eines Versuchsprivilegs, sollten diese Entscheidungen beru¨cksichtigen,
dass sich dann mehr Unternehmen sich dafu¨r entscheiden, ihre Erfindungen
geheimzuhalten. Dies ko¨nnte weitere nachteilige Auswirkungen auf die In-
novationskraft und ku¨nftige Produktivita¨t einer Volkswirtschaft nach sich
ziehen.
Giving Away the Game? The Impact of the Disclosure
Effect on the Patenting Decision
Diana Heger‡∗ and Alexandra K. Zaby†∗
Abstract
This article explores the propensity to patent in the light of the disclosure
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1 Introduction
In the literature, patenting is widely acknowledged as a major tool to re-
ward innovative firms for their efforts in research and development (R&D).
However, many firms decide not to patent their inventions. Understanding
a patent according to the original sense of patent law, it basically has two
functions: The first is to mitigate the problem of unintended spillover of R&D
outcomes by providing an effective tool of temporary knowledge protection.
This protective effect of a patent enables the inventor to appropriate the
returns from his research efforts. The second function of a patent is to con-
tribute to the diffusion of (new) knowledge by requiring the disclosure of the
invention to society. We assume that the disclosure of knowledge inherent to
a patent system only has an impact on the patenting decision if the disclosed
information is relevant for the patentee’s competitors. We aim to tackle
the question how the extent of the disclosure effect influences an innovator’s
propensity to patent. To this end, we present a theoretical model from which
we draw predictions. Those predictions are then tested empirically.
To be able to analyze the impact of the disclosure effect on the propensity
to patent we need a setting in which patent protection is imperfect. Our
theoretical analysis builds on a model presented in Zaby (2010). To cap-
ture imperfect patent protection, the decision to patent is introduced into
a model setting with horizontally differentiated products where competitors
may enter the market despite of a patent, i.e. they are able to successfully
invent around the patent.1 As the mandatorily disclosed information in a
patent specification is accessible and usable for the innovator’s competitors,
the relevancy that this information has for their respective research activ-
ities influences the easiness of inventing around the patent.2 The inventor
1Introducing patent protection into a setting with horizontally differentiated products
goes back to Klemperer (1990). The main focus of his paper is to analyze a patent’s
optimal design with regard to its length and breadth, whereas the patenting decision per
se is not considered. This is accomplished by two subsequent papers: Waterson (1990)
focusses on a comparison of alternative patent systems with regard to social welfare, and
Harter (1994) examines the propensity to patent accounting for a disclosure effect. The
major drawback of the latter modeling approach is that only one potential competitor
profits from the merits of the mandatory disclosure. This fact, which largely delimitates
the impact of the disclosure requirement, in the end leads Harter (1994) to conclude that
there is no causal relation between the required disclosure and the propensity to patent.
2By assuming that the information disclosed in a patent specification is accessible and
usable by competing firms for own research purposes, we implicitly postulate a legislative
environment where a research use exemption is in place. This is the case in most of the
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has to balance this negative disclosure effect of patenting against the posi-
tive protective effect. This positive effect stems from the fact that a patent
restricts the strategies of competitors: The broader the scope of the patent,
the narrower is the area in which competitors may enter the market without
infringing the patent. Our main finding is that the weaker the impact of the
disclosure effect the higher is the propensity to patent.
Subsequent to the theoretical analysis we investigate our findings empiri-
cally. The data basis is the 2005 survey of the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP) provided by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in
Mannheim. In this year, besides the common innovation indicators the MIP
also collects information on the firms’ competitive environment. Using this
data set our empirical model reflects the propensity to patent depending on
the extent of the disclosure effect.
To our best knowledge, besides own previous work, no theoretical literature
and only very sparse empirical literature exists which analyzes the impact of
the disclosure effect on patenting activity. Most of the economic literature
implicitly assumes that the disclosure requirement has no impact on the pro-
tective effect of a patent and consequently on the propensity to patent. Or
more precisely it is assumed that the disclosure requirement is only effective
after a patent’s expiry. This implies that the use of the disclosed invention
for subsequent innovation is strongly limited during the patent term. But
this approach neglects the possibility of inventing around the precedent in-
vention and entering the market with an improved – and oftentimes even
non-infringing – product. Our work relates to several contributions which
also consider that patenting has a disclosure effect In the work of Scotchmer
and Green (1990) and Erkal (2005) the extent of the disclosure requirement
remains fixed whereas Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006), Aoki and Spiegel
(2009) and Harter (1994) assume that the impact of the required disclosure
may vary. However, the latter contributions do not explicitly focus on the
consequences that a varying impact of the disclosure requirement has on the
counter-effects of patenting and in the end on the propensity to patent. Aoki
and Spiegel (2009) focus on the influence of alternative filing procedures on
European countries; e.g. in Germany § 11 PatG defines a broad research use exemption
which includes all non-commercial research and trial activities as well as the research on
the patented subject. Research with the patented matter remains an infringing action.
In the U.S. a research use exemption exists but its practical and legal implementation
provokes uncertainty for firms relying on patented knowledge for their research activities.
In the absence of a research use exemption the proposed model simplifies to the case where
the relevancy variable (defined below) is set to unity.
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the propensity to patent, Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006) analyze the choice
of alternative licensing contracts and Harter (1994) due to restrictive model
assumptions comes to the conclusion that the propensity to patent is not at
all influenced by the impact of the disclosure requirement.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the theoretical
model. The considered three stage game is solved backward, beginning with
the analysis of the price competition on the last stage of the game in Section
2.1, proceeding with the market entry decisions on the second stage of the
game in Section 2.2 and finally the innovator’s patenting decision on the first
stage of the game in Section 2.3. The deduction of our predictions based on
the theoretical model, the data description and the empirical investigation
of our theoretical findings are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Proofs can be found in Zaby (2010).
2 The Model
Assume that one of n firms engaged in an innovation race has successfully
accomplished a drastic product innovation which it brings to the market af-
ter deciding whether to protect it by a patent or by secrecy. The innovator
will be monopolist in the new market as long as no other firm successfully
innovates. The new product may be varied horizontally in its product char-
acteristics which are assumed to be continuously distributed on a circle of
unit-circumference. The innovator (and any other entering firm) can only of-
fer one variant of the good. We denote the total number of firms that operate
in this differentiated oligopoly as N = n+ 1, consisting of the innovator and
n entering firms. Consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed over
the circle, with density normalized to one. The preference of a consumer z is
given by his position on the circle, xz ∈ [0, 1], and we assume without loss of
generality that the innovator of the new product, denoted by the index ν, is
located at xν = 0. If a consumer cannot buy a good according to his prefer-
ence he incurs a disutility that rises quadratically with the distance between
his preferred good and the offered good. We will refer to this disutility as
mismatch costs. Each consumer purchases one unit of the good which yields
the highest net utility, Ux = v − pz − (x− xz)2 ≥ 0. We assume throughout
the paper that the reservation price v is very high so that no consumer prefers
the outside option.3
3See Zaby (2010) for a relaxation of this assumption.
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The structure of the model is as follows: on the first stage of a three-stage
game the innovator decides whether to patent his innovation or to keep it
secret. Denoting the strategy patent by φ and secrecy by s we can summarize
these strategy choices by σ1ν = {φ, s}. A patent protects a given range of
product space on the unit circle against the entry of rival firms. The extent
of protection is defined by the breadth of the patent, β ∈ ]0, 1[, which is
exogenously given.4 We assume that the protected product space is situated
symmetrically around the location of the patentee’s product. As we set xν =
0, this point on the circle defines the middle of the protected product space,
see Figure ??. From there patent protection covers β/2 of the neighboring
product space on either side of the innovation.
< Insert Figure ?? about here. >
On the second stage potential rivals simultaneously decide whether to en-
ter the new market, given the patenting decision of the innovator, σ2n =
{entry, no entry}.
Upon entry all firms face market entry costs. These can be interpreted as
the barriers to entry that firms need to overcome to complete their so far
unsuccessful research projects. They may consist of non-monetary costs, e.g.
time, search costs for highly skilled researchers, resources dedicated to the
analysis of the expected demand, or monetary investments, e.g. salaries for
researchers, money spent for research equipment. By investing the fixed costs
of market entry, firms can achieve the capability to produce a variant of the
new product. If the innovator decides to patent his discovery, according to
patent law he is required to disclose sufficient information so that anyone
skilled in the art is able to reproduce the patented product. Although com-
petitors are not allowed to enter the market with an exact imitation of the
protected product, they have the possibility to invent around the patent as
long as patent breadth does not deter entry completely, β < 1.
If the information included in the patent application is relevant and thus
useful for a rival firm, achieving the capability to enter the new market is
easier and becomes less costly. To capture this theoretically, we assume that
market entry costs decrease by patenting. Denoting market entry costs in the
4Contrasting this assumption patent breadth can also be interpreted as a strategic
decision variable of the innovator, see Yiannaka and Fulton (2006).
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case of secrecy by fs, in the case of a patent they decrease to fφ with fφ = αfs,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, where α is a measure for the extent of the disclosure effect – the
lower α, the higher is the disclosure effect. The difference between market
entry costs with and without a patent yields the amount of mandatorily
disclosed information, ∆f = (1−α)fs. While it may well be that competitors
very intensively profit from the disclosed information (α is low), it could also
be that the opposite is the case and the information is useless (α is high).5
If α is set to one, the disclosure effect is absent, fφ = fs, i.e. if the disclosed
information is irrelevant for competitors, disclosure has no effect on their
market entry costs.
Concerning the location of firms, we will use the well established Principle of
Maximum Differentiation (see Salop (1979)): Firms will locate as far away
from each other as possible to soften price competition.6 If secrecy prevails
firms will locate equidistantly with distance 1/N s on the unit circle, where
N s is the number of firms operating in the market with secrecy. With a
patent the non-patentee firms can no longer freely locate on the unit circle.
Still, they will try to move as close as possible to their profit maximizing,
equidistant locations. Consequently, in the case of a patent, when the choice
of location is restricted to the product space 1 − β, the direct neighbors of
the patentee will locate at the borders of the patent and all other entrants
will locate equidistantly between them.
On the third stage all firms in the new market compete in prices, σ3ν,N = {p}.
2.1 Price Competition
To find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the game by back-
ward induction, setting off with the last stage. Here we have to distinguish
the cases:
(i) the innovator has not patented, σ1ν = {s},
(ii) the innovator has patented σ1ν = {φ}
5This interpretation of α is related to the term “appropriability” that Kamien and Zang
(2000) used for the capability of firms to appropriate the unintended R&D spillover flows
from competing firms. While firms in their setting are able to endogenously determine
their ability to appropriate in our model “relevancy” is a purely exogenous variable which
is subject to the respective market for the innovation.
6Kats (1995) shows that this principle leads to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
a location then price game in a circular market.
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We will consider the cases subsequently, starting with case (i).
(i) the innovator has not patented σ1ν = {s}
In the case that the innovator refrains from patenting and chooses secrecy to
protect his innovation, our model simplifies to the well known Salop (1979)
model of a circular city which we will briefly analyze in the following: All firms
are symmetric so that it suffices to analyze the decision of one representative
firm denoted by k. With moderate market entry costs, every consumer in
the non-protected market buys one unit of the differentiated product from
the firm that offers the variant which is closest to his preferences.7
Standard computations then yield equilibrium prices,
p∗ = 1/(N s)2, (1)
and profits
pi∗n = 1/(N
s)3 − fs (2)
for the N s entering firms. Note that the profit of the innovator amounts to
pi∗ν = 1/(N
s)3 (3)
as he does not face market entry costs.
(ii) the innovator has patented σ1ν = {φ}
Now let us turn to case (ii) and look at the situation when the innovator
decides to protect the new product by a patent. As long as the breadth of
the patent is rather moderate, β/2 < 1/N s, the patent does not influence the
location of rival firms and the symmetric result derived above emerges. Note
though, that market entry costs decrease subject to the disclosure effect in
the respective market. If the non-patentee firms are able to use the disclosed
information to a rather large extent (α is low), more firms than in the case
with secrecy might enter the market so that Nφ > N s. To start with, we will
exclude this possibility and assume that the number of firms is left unchanged
by a patent, Nφ = N s. If the protectional degree of the patent is high,
β ≥ βres ≡ 2
N s
, (4)
7In this paper we exclude the monopoly case. See Zaby (2010) for an extensive analysis
of this issue.
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equidistant locations on the entire circumference of the circle are no longer
possible as the patent restricts the locations for entering firms to the product
space 1 − β. We will define patents in a setting where patent breadth, β,
fulfills condition (4) as restrictive patents. The following figure depicts firms’
locations with Nφ = 4 for the cases (a) that the patent is not restrictive
(β < 1/2), and (b) that the patent is restrictive (β ≥ 1/2).
< Insert Figure ?? about here. >
In the case that the innovator has patented, firms’ neighborhoods are no
longer uniform, but are dependent on the respective location of a firm. To
distinguish firms’ locations we will refer to the left and right neighbor of the
innovator as firms i and j. Further we will denote the first right (left) neighbor
of i (j) by i+ 1 (j + 1), the second by i+ 2 (j + 2) and so on. Consequently,
with a restrictive patent an equilibrium can no longer be derived by analyzing
a representative firm, as the respective neighborhood of a firm now plays a
crucial role for its pricing decision. We have to distinguish three types of
firms, differing by their respective neighborhood:
a) the patentee has a uniform neighborhood consisting of firms i and j
b) the
”
border“ firms i and j have a non-uniform neighborhood with the
patentee on the one side and either each other or, if n > 2, a non-
patentee, non-border firm i+ 1 or j + 1 on the other side
c) a non-patentee, non-border firm i+ κ, κ ≥ 1 always has a non-uniform
neighborhood (i+ κ− 1 to the left, i+ κ+ 1 to the right side) as long
as it is not the firm with the greatest distance to the patentee.8
As we are analyzing the last stage of the game we take the number of firms
that have entered the market as given. Due to the fact that the neighborhood
8For this firm we need to distinguish two cases that depend on the number of non-
patentee firms n
• if n is even, which we will denote by ne, then the firm furthest away from the
patentee is firm i+ (ne/2− 1) and its neighborhood is non-uniform: to the left firm
i+ (ne/2− 2), to the right firm j + (ne/2− 1)
• if n is uneven, nu, then the firm furthest away is firm i+ (nu − 1)/2 and its neigh-
borhood is uniform: to the left firm i+ (nu − 3)/2, to the right firm j + (nu − 3)/2.
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of every firm is crucial for its individual demand and thus pricing decision, we
will have to distinguish the indifferent consumer between every pair of firms,
say y and z. From the viewpoint of firm y the indifferent consumer will be
denoted by xˆy,z, from the viewpoint of its neighbor z it will be denoted by
xˆz,y. By standard computations the location of the indifferent consumer can
be found by equating the respective utilities a consumer realizes by buying
from either of its neighboring firms.
Given the indifferent consumer the demand and the price reaction functions
of the respective firm types can be derived. For an extensive elaboration on
this see Zaby (2010).
2.2 Market Entry
The analysis of the market entry decisions again needs to distinguish the
cases (i) the innovator has not patented and (ii) the innovator has patented.
It is crucial for our analysis of the impact of the disclosure effect on the
propensity to patent that even if the innovator patents, competitors have the
possibility to enter the market by inventing around the patent. As market
entry costs decrease subject to the strength of the disclosure effect it might
be that more firms are able to enter with patent protection than with secrecy.
(i) the innovator has not patented σ1ν = {s}
Whenever the innovator decides to keep his discovery secret the analysis of
the market entry decisions of his rivals corresponds to the well known Salop
result: the number of firms entering the market can be derived by solving
the zero-profit condition pisn = 0 of a representative firm for n. Using (2) we
get
(ns)0 = (1/fs)
1/3 − 1. (5)
(ii) the innovator has patented σ1ν = {φ}
If we turn to case (ii) and assume that the innovator has patented his inno-
vation on the first stage of the game, we can no longer pin down the market
entry decisions in one zero-profit condition. Due to the asymmetric neigh-
borhoods of firms the analysis of market entry becomes more complex. In
the following we will briefly outline the derivation of the critical thresholds of
8
market entry costs fφ that yield varying market structures.
9 As the patentee
always operates in the market himself the total number of firms consists of
him and the number of entering firms. In the case that the innovator has
patented we denote the entering rival firms by nφ so that Nφ = nφ + 1. To
ease notation we simply use the respective number of firms operating in the
market as subscript, so e.g. the subscript 4 stands for the case Nφ = 4 and
piν, 4 denotes the profit of the patentee in the case that 4 firms operate in the
market.
For a sufficient definition of the number of entering competitors an upper
and a lower bound for market entry costs have to be defined. We denote the
upper bound of a market structure with N firms as fN . This means that
for market entry costs fN ≥ f at least N firms are able to enter. The exact
number can be defined by additionally defining a lower boundary assuring
that no more than N firms can enter. We refer to this critical threshold
as fN+1. Obviously the potential entrant(s) with the lowest profits is (are)
decisive for this threshold. Whenever profits decrease due to higher market
entry costs his (their) profit(s) will be the first to become negative. Following
economic intuition the firm(s) with the lowest profit(s) must be the firm(s)
located at the furthest distance to the patentee. This is due to the following
fact: The border firms i and j are able to set the highest prices of all non-
patentee firms, as they face a relatively large mass of consumers situated
between themselves and the patentee. Recall that due to patent protection,
no rival firm is able to enter in this area. This positive price effect of patent
protection is passed on to every other neighbor, but it gets weaker the further
away from the patentee a firm is located.
Whenever the number of entering firms, nφ, is even, all rivals have a semi-
symmetric partner and thus the profits of the two firms located at the greatest
distance to the patentee define the lower bound of market entry costs. When-
ever the number of entering firms is uneven, the firm located furthest away
from the patentee has no semi-symmetric partner and thus the lower bound
of market entry costs is given by its profits.
Given both boundaries for market entry costs the number of entering firms
in general is sufficiently defined by
fN ≥ f > fN+1 . (6)
9The analysis of the cases Nφ < 4 can be found in Zaby (2010). They reveal some
special issues which are not essential for the qualitative results concerning the impact of
the disclosure effect on the propensity to patent, so we omit these cases here.
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The derivation of the critical boundaries is in detail described in Zaby (2010).
2.3 The Patenting Decision
On the first stage of the three-stage game the innovator decides whether to
patent his innovation or to keep it secret, σ1ν = {φ, s}. His patenting decision
is driven by two opposing effects. On the one hand a patent protects part
of the market, β, from the entrance of rival firms. We refer to this as the
protective effect of patenting. On the other hand the patentee faces the con-
sequences from the disclosure requirement linked to a patent. The disclosure
effect might lead to decreasing market entry costs. This may possibly make
market entry profitable for a larger number of firms than with secrecy. Recall
that we defined the reduction of market entry costs as ∆f = (1− α)fs.
In the following we need to distinguish two cases: (i) the disclosure effect is
so strong (i.e. α is so low) that the competitors are able to use a substantial
part of the disclosed information and (ii) the disclosure effect is rather weak
(i.e. α is high) due to the fact that the relevancy of the disclosed information
is low. In case (i) the strong disclosure effect leads to a major reduction of
market entry costs and thus enables more firms to enter the market whenever
the initial innovation is patented so that Nφ > N s. Technically speaking,
the number of firms which are able to enter increases whenever market entry
costs decrease below the critical threshold fN+1, see Equation (6). Thus
more firms will be able to enter due to patenting whenever fφ = αfs < fN+1.
Rearranging we get a critical condition for the strength of the disclosure
effect, α < fN+1/fs, which defines whether the disclosure effect has an impact
on the market structure or not. Defining αN ≡ fN+1/fs we can state that
whenever αN > α ≥ 0 the disclosure effect has an impact on the propensity
to patent as it enables more firms to enter the market. In case (ii) a weak
disclosure effect leads to an only minor reduction of market entry costs so
that Nφ = N s. Technically speaking, the disclosure effect has no impact
whenever 1 ≥ α ≥ αN .
Figure ?? illustrates the critical thresholds of market entry costs for alter-
native levels of patent breadth, β, where the solid lines depict the critical
thresholds for the case that the innovator chooses secrecy and the dashed
lines depict the critical thresholds for the case that the innovator patents.10
10Note that to maintain clarity we omitted fs,Ns for N
s > 6. These curves would be
located below fs, 6.
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< Insert Figure ?? about here. >
Obviously the curves fφ,Nφ and fs,Ns are equal up to the point where patent
protection becomes restrictive, β ≥ 2/N s. All combinations of f and β that
lie between two curves fN and fN+1 lead to a situation where N firms enter
the market. Thus in the shaded area in Figure ??, Nφ = 5 firms would enter
the market with a patent while with secrecy N s ≥ 5 could enter in this area.
Obviously, given market entry costs and patent breadth, a patent may lead
to two different cases:11
(a) due to a dominant disclosure effect more firms are able to enter with a
patent, i.e. the disclosure effect has an impact on the market structure;
(b) due to a dominant protective effect the number of firms is not changed
by patenting, i.e. the disclosure effect has no impact on the market
structure.
Take for example the case where patent breadth is rather low, β¯, and thus
the protective effect is only moderate. Given market entry costs, f¯s, we are
at point A where N s = 4. By patenting the disclosure effect reduces market
entry costs to αf¯s. In this example case the disclosure effect has an impact as
by patenting we move to point A′ where Nφ = 5 firms are able to enter (case
(a)). Keeping the strength of the disclosure effect fixed and increasing patent
breadth to β¯, we are at point B where again N s = 4 firms can enter with
secrecy. By patenting market entry costs are reduced by the same amount
as before so we move to point B′. In this case the disclosure effect has no
impact as with Nφ = 4 firms entering the market structure is left unaffected
by patenting. Consequently, opposing the case with a low protective effect
due to a low β, a strong protective effect may overcompensate the impact of
the disclosure effect (case (b)).
To find out whether the innovator will choose to patent or to keep his innova-
tion secret in the cases considered above, we need to compare the respective
profits he can realize given the alternative combinations of market entry costs
and patent breadth. In the following figure the profits of the innovator sub-
ject to f and β are plotted for the cases that he chooses a patent (dashed
lines) or secrecy (solid lines).
11In fact, a third case where due to a dominant protective effect less firms enter with a
patent may prevail, see Zaby (2010) for details.
11
< Insert Figure ?? about here. >
Let us start with the analysis of case (a) where more firms are able to enter
due to a patent. In our example case with moderate patent breadth, β¯, we
need to compare the profits As and Aφ. Obviously the innovator is better off
with secrecy in this case, as then he realizes higher profits, pisν, 4(β¯) > pi
φ
ν, 5(β¯).
Things change in case (b) where we assumed a higher patent breadth, β¯.
Here we have N s = Nφ = 4. Comparing the profits at points Bφ and Bs
shows that in this case the innovator is better off with a patent, as this yields
higher profits, piφν, 4(β¯) > pi
s
ν, 4(β¯).
The following Proposition summarizes our results so far.
Proposition 1 Whenever the disclosure effect has no impact,
1 ≥ α ≥ αN , so that N s ≥ Nφ, the innovator’s protection decision depends
solely on the protective effect of a patent. If
(i) β ≤ 2/N s the protective effect is low and the innovator always prefers
secrecy
(ii) β > 2/N s the protective effect is high and the innovator always prefers
to patent.
The above Proposition covers the situation where the disclosure effect has no
impact, which leaves us to analyze the case where due to the required disclo-
sure of the innovation and the relevancy of this information for competitors,
more firms are able to enter the market with a patent, Nφ > N s (case (a)).
Again using Figure ?? it is easy to see that if the disclosure effect is so sub-
stantial that the number of firms in the market increases by patenting, it
is nevertheless subject to patent breadth whether the innovator is better off
with a patent.
Obviously the patent profit functions piφ
ν,Nφ
for Nφ > 4 cross at least one
secrecy profit function piφν,Ns with N
φ > N s. We will refer to the intersection
point as βˆNs, Nφ . As the patent profit functions are increasing in patent
breadth, the innovator will prefer secrecy for relatively low values of patent
breadth, β ≤ βˆNs, Nφ , and he will prefer to patent for relatively high values
of patent breadth, β > βˆNs, Nφ . Take for example the situation where with
secrecy 4 firms would enter the market and with a patent 6 firms could
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enter due to the market entry costs reduction imposed by the disclosure
requirement. The relevant intersection point in this case is βˆ4, 6. Whenever
patent breadth is lower than βˆ4, 6 the protective effect of the patent is too
weak to overcompensate the negative disclosure effect and the innovator will
prefer secrecy as this yields higher profits. If patent breadth exceeds the
critical threshold, the protective effect overcompensates the disclosure effect
and the innovator is better off with a patent. Generalizing these results we
come to our next Proposition.
Proposition 2 Whenever the disclosure effect has an impact,
αN > α ≥ 0, so that Nφ > N s, the innovator will
(i) prefer secrecy for all β ≤ βˆNs, Nφ,
(ii) prefer to patent if and only if patent breadth exceeds a critical threshold
β > βˆNs, Nφ.
A comparison of the critical thresholds for patenting in the theoretically
alternative cases of Proposition 1 and 2 leads us to
Corollary 1 The propensity to patent is higher whenever the impact of the
disclosure effect is weak.
Whenever the innovator’s competitors do not want to use the disclosed infor-
mation due to its minor relevancy, the negative disclosure effect is mitigated
and has no impact on the propensity to patent. If the disclosed information
becomes more profitable for competitors the disclosure effect has a detrimen-
tal impact on the propensity to patent.
3 Empirical Investigation
Summarizing, the theoretical analysis comes to the conclusion that an inno-
vator’s decision between a patent and secrecy is mainly driven by two factors:
the relevancy of the disclosed information for competitors, α, and initial mar-
ket entry costs fs. A variation of these factors may intensify the disclosure
effect and may thereby lead to a decreasing propensity to patent.
Recall that it is the market-specific variation of the relevancy of the disclosed
information, α, which drives the extent of the disclosure effect. The more
intensively competitors benefit from the information disclosed in the patent
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specification, i.e. the lower is α, the higher is the extent of the disclosure
effect. This effect leads to a change in market entry costs for the patentee’s
rivals by the amount ∆f ≡ fs − αfs. According to Propositions 1 and 2 the
propensity to patent is higher, the lower this disclosure effect is.
When looking at market entry costs in the case of a patent, the relevancy
of the disclosed information α, in theoretical terms, is always linked to the
height of initial market entry costs, fs. Whenever α decreases, market entry
costs in the case of a patent decrease, ∂fφ/∂α > 0. This in turn leads to an
increasing number of firms that are able to enter the market despite a patent.
This negative effect of patenting then leads to a decreasing propensity to
patent.
Besides the combined effect αfs, initial market entry costs fs itself have coun-
tervailing effects on the propensity to patent. One of these effects clearly is in
line with economic intuition as it stems from the fact that increasing market
entry costs form a natural barrier to entry, so that patenting, i.e. establish-
ing own, costly entry barriers, becomes obsolete. In terms of our theoretical
model, increasing market entry costs lead to an increase of the critical thresh-
old for a restrictive patent, βres. This leads to an increase of the minimum
strength of protection which induces a higher positive protective effect of a
patent. As a consequence the parameter space of patent breadth, β, where
patenting potentially leads to a protective effect strong enough to overcom-
pensate the negative effect from mandatory disclosure, becomes narrower.
Through this mechanism increasing market entry costs weaken the protec-
tive effect and thereby have a negative impact on the propensity to patent.
Besides this negative effect market entry costs may also positively influence
the propensity to patent. This evolves from the critical threshold concerning
the impact of the disclosure effect, αN ≡ fN+1/fs. As αN decreases whenever
initial market entry costs increase, the parameter space where the disclosure
effect has no impact on the resulting market structure grows larger and thus
the propensity to patent increases. Before we proceed with the empirical
investigation it should be noted that a basic difference between the theoret-
ical and the empirical analysis is the fact that in the theoretical model the
cases where either the disclosure effect has a strong or a weak impact were
excluding cases. Naturally in reality both cases prevail at the same time. In
some markets the relevancy of the disclosed information may be higher than
in others.
The empirical analysis proceeds with the deduction of three predictions from
the theoretical model in Section 3.1. Subsequently we will turn to the defi-
nition of our data sample and the implementation of the variables in Section
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3.2 before we turn to our empirical results in Section 3.3.
3.1 Predictions of the Theoretical Model and their Em-
pirical Implementation
As pointed out above, the theoretical model identifies two main parameters as
crucial for the propensity to patent: the relevancy of the disclosed information
for competitors, α, and initial market entry costs fs. In the above summary
the influence of increasing market entry costs on the propensity to patent
was divided into countervailing effects.
The theoretical model does not allow for a conclusion on which effect of mar-
ket entry costs is strongest. Therefore we formulate two opposing predictions
and leave it to the empirical investigation to identify the prevailing effect of
market entry barriers on the propensity to patent.
Prediction 1 The propensity to patent decreases when market entry costs
increase.
Prediction 2 The propensity to patent increases when market entry costs
increase.
Note that the above Predictions propose that the weakening effect of market
entry costs on the protective effect may even overcompensate the combined
effect αfs, which captures the impact of the disclosure effect on the propen-
sity to patent. On the one hand, whenever the relevancy parameter is low,
the negative effect of the required disclosure is mitigated as the revealed in-
formation is nearly useless for the innovator’s competitors. In this case, due
to their respective competitive environment, competitors are not able to use
the disclosed information, i.e. if the innovator chooses to patent, their market
entry costs are only slightly reduced. This low impact of the disclosure effect
obviously has a positive effect on the propensity to patent. On the other
hand, whenever the relevancy parameter is high, patenting has a strong neg-
ative effect, as the mandatorily disclosed information has a high relevancy
for competitors’ innovation activities, i.e. market entry costs are strongly
reduced so that market entry becomes profitable for more firms. Summariz-
ing we can state that a decreasing relevancy of the information disclosed by
patenting has a positive effect on the propensity to patent. This gives us the
third prediction.
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Prediction 3 Whenever the impact of the disclosure effect decreases, the
propensity to patent increases.
We translate these theoretical results into the following empirical equation:
P = β0 + β1MEC + β2REL+ β3REL ∗MEC + Controls+ ,
where P denotes the patenting decision, MEC are the initial costs of market
entry, and REL reflects the relevancy of the disclosed information for the
patentee’s competitors.
To capture the disclosure effect in empirical terms we include the combined
effect REL ∗MEC, as the theoretical model proposes that this reflects the
impact of the disclosure effect on the propensity to patent.
In the previous section we extensively discussed that we expect the single
effect of MEC to be ambiguous: as initial market entry costs rise, the barriers
to entry increase so that the usefulness of a patent diminishes, resulting in
a decrease of the propensity to patent. However, the interaction term with
relevancy, REL ∗MEC, which reflects the impact of the disclosure effect,
should reveal a negative effect on patenting.
3.2 Sample and Variable Definition
The basis for our empirical analysis is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)
of the year 2005 consisting of about 5,000 surveyed German firms. The MIP
is an annual survey which is conducted by the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW) Mannheim on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Ed-
ucation and Research. The aim of the survey is to provide a tool to investigate
the innovation activities of German manufacturing and service firms. Regu-
larly – currently every two years – the MIP is the German contribution to the
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). In the year 2005, the survey contained
additional questions concerning the firms’ perception of their competitive
situation with respect to competitive factors like price or quality as well as
the perceived competitive situation regarding the number of competitors and
their relative size.
A central assumption to our theoretical analysis is that the successful inventor
commercializes his invention immediately, thereby opening a new market. To
implement this in empirical terms, we restrict our data to innovative firms
by implementing the binding constraint that the sample firms have recently
introduced either a product or a process innovation. Furthermore, we reduce
the sample to firms which indicate that their innovation activities resulted
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in the establishment of new markets.12 Hence, considering all theoretical
assumptions our empirical investigation is based on a sample of 799 firms.
In the restricted data set we have about 45% of firms indicating that they
applied for a patent to protect their intellectual property in the considered
time period of the years 2002 to 2004. To capture the relevancy of the
disclosed information for competitors, REL, we use a proxy reflecting the
easiness of substitutability of own products by products of competitors in the
main product market. The survey respondents could rate the extent of this
characteristic of the product market choosing between “completely applies”,
“mainly applies”, “hardly applies” and “does not apply”. Whenever firms
indicate that the easiness of substitutability completely or mainly applies,
the proxy REL has unit value. Descriptive statistics reveal that nearly 70%
of firms find that their competitive environment is characterized by easy to
substitute products.
A further crucial parameter of the theoretical model are market entry costs
which are not straightforward to implement empirically. Recall that the theo-
retical interpretation of these barriers to entry is very broad as it includes the
monetary as well as the non-monetary investments necessary to accomplish
a successful entry into the envisioned market. As we aim at the pioneer’s de-
cision to patent, it is his assessment of the barriers to entry his competitors
face, which is relevant. Translating this into empirical terms we refer to a
firm’s perception on whether its market position is threatened by the entry
of new rivals, threat of entry (TOE) as one possible proxy for initial market
entry costs, MEC. The question of whether the competitive environment
in the main product market is characterized by a high threat of the market
position by the market entry of new competitors could be answered by one
of the following categories: “completely applies”, “mainly applies”, “hardly
applies” and “does not apply”. We define this proxy to take unit value when-
ever a firm perceives its market position as hardly or weakly threatened by
the market entry of competitors, indicating that initial market entry costs
are high. This is found relevant by almost 90% of the sampled firms.
As the threat of entry is only a rough approximation for market entry costs
and may well reflect other effects, we want to substantiate our results al-
ternatively using the actual entry of new competitors. Therefore, we take
12To answer the question about their innovation activities’ results the firms could eval-
uate the evaluate the extent of establishing a new market by ticking “high”, “medium”,
“low” or “not relevant”. We kept all firms which have chosen “high” or “medium”. Other
(non-exclusive) results of innovation activities are “increase of market share”, “quality im-
provement”, “production flexibility”, “increased capacity” etc.
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into account the number of newly founded firms (NEW) in a respondent’s
respective industry. This measure has been calculated by using the ZEW
Enterprise Panel where all active German firms are listed. Data collection
is carried out by Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency. The
ZEW Enterprise Panel contains reliable information on the firms’ number of
employees, sales and industry affiliation. Newly established firms in a specific
sector are identified by counting all firms assigned to a specific 3-digit-NACE
code. The advantage of this measure is that the information is objective as
opposed to the MIP where information relies on the perception of the firms
which may be biased. Furthermore, the ZEW Enterprise Panel has a longi-
tudinal dimension so that we are able to lag the number of newly established
firms to avoid endogeneity problems. We use the logarithm of the number of
firms in the year 2001.
< Insert Table 1 about here. >
As described in Section 3.1 we include the combined effect of the impact of
the disclosure effect and market entry costs, REL ∗ MEC. Since market
entry costs are captured in two alternative ways (low threat of entry and
newly founded firms) we alternatively use the interaction terms REL ∗TOE
and REL ∗ NEW , which reflect the market entry costs if the relevancy of
the disclosed information for the competitors is high.
Furthermore, we control for several factors that may influence the decision
to patent. To reflect the influence of the number of competitors the paten-
tee faces, we use a categorical variable provided by the MIP displaying the
ranges of the number of competitors as perceived by a firm.13 We use a
dummy variable large number of firms which indicates that a respondent
firm has more than 15 competitors. In our data set this is the case for 16%
of all firms. Firm size is represented by the lagged number of employees in
the year 2002, human capital by the lagged share of employees holding a uni-
versity degree. In order to capture whether the main market is characterized
by specific market entry barriers, we control for (lagged) capital intensity
defined as tangible assets per employee. Furthermore, as R&D is viewed as
a crucial input for potentially patentable innovation activities we control for
13The ranges are defined as follows: no competitors, 1 to 5 competitors, 6 to 15 com-
petitors and more than 15 competitors.
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(lagged) R&D intensity defined as expenditures for in-house R&D activities
per sales.14 If firms cooperate with others, e.g. competitors, customers, uni-
versities, in conducting R&D this may influence their IP protection strategy.
Therefore we include a dummy variable reflecting whether research coop-
erations take place. Demand conditions on the product market may also
influence firms’ IP protection strategy. Firms could choose the extent of
the share of sales generated by the three most important customers between
“100 %”, “50 to 99 %”, “20 to 49 %” and “below 20 %”. Hence, Customer
power refers to the fact that the share of sales by the three most important
customers exceeds 50% of total sales. Finally we describe the competitive
situation with respect to the geographical dimension of the product market.
We control for two world regions, the EU and non-EU. Germany, i.e. the
local, regional and national markets, serves as reference category in the re-
gression. Thus it is not contained in the variable EU. In order to capture
regional and sectoral differences we include an indicator whether the firm is
located in eastern Germany (east) and define 11 industry dummies.
3.3 Empirical Results
To test the influence of a varying impact of the disclosure effect, which the
theoretical model identified as the combined effect of the relevancy of the
disclosed information for competitors and initial market entry costs, on the
propensity to patent we estimate a probit model and calculate marginal ef-
fects evaluated at the sample means. The marginal effect of the interaction
term is calculated according to Ai and Norton (2003). Results are presented
in Table 2.
< Insert Table 2 about here. >
First, we look at the results for the market entry costs. As described in
Section 3.2 we reflect market entry costs using two alternative variables: the
threat of entry and the number of newly founded firms.15 To begin with we
14Note that while capital intensity is taken from the year 2002 due to the lack of adequate
data we could only use R&D expenditures of the year 2003.
15Another measure to capture the market entry costs is the minimum efficient scale.
This measure could be calculated a the mean of industry sales (industry sales divided by
the number of firms in an industry) at the 3-digit NACE level taken form the statistics
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focus on the threat of entry. As pointed out earlier the theoretical model
proposes countervailing effects of market entry costs on the propensity to
patent. The empirical estimation now allows us to draw a conclusion about
which of the effects is strongest. Since we find a positively significant total
effect, the mitigating impact of initial market entry costs on the disclosure
effect obviously overcompensates the other negative effects. Thus, by reduc-
ing the critical threshold, αN , and thereby increasing the parameter space in
which the disclosure effect has no impact on the resulting market structure,
increasing market entry costs lead to a rising propensity to patent. This
points to the fact that actually market entry costs do not form a sufficiently
strong natural barrier to entry so that even with high market entry costs
patenting does not become obsolete. This finding is in line with Prediction
2. Concerning the combined effect of market entry costs and the relevancy
of the disclosed information for the competitors, REL ∗ TOE, we find a
negative marginal effect. The interpretation is straightforward. Recall from
the theoretical model how αfs drives the negative effect of patenting, i.e.
the loss of information. With secrecy, market entry costs are given by fs, by
patenting they are reduced to fφ ≡ αfs. Recall from above that the disclosed
information amounts to ∆f = fs − αfs. Hence, in industries with a low α,
the combination with increasing market entry costs, fs, increases the change
in market entry costs, ∆f , so that firms’ propensity to patent decreases.
We now turn to the number of newly founded firms as an approximation
for the market entry costs. We find that the positive total effects turns
insignificant which means that the countervailing effect (see Prediction 1 and
2) of market entry costs neutralize each other. However, the interaction
effect, REL ∗ NEW , still displays a negative effect. The marginal effect
of the interaction term shows that in the case when the disclosure effect
has an impact an increasing number of newly established firms reduces the
propensity to patent. At first glance this result contradicts the previous
finding: The negative effect indicates that, in a situation where the disclosure
effect has an impact, a high number of newly established firms would decrease
the propensity to patent. However, the variable newly founded firms displays
the number of new firms which entered the market before the decision to
patent takes place. Hence, the formation of new firms is not only an indicator
for market entry costs but also a measure for an increasing number of firms
of the German Monopoly Commission. The caveat of this measure is that it reduces
our sample heavily (the number of observations would halve) as this information is only
available for manufacturing.
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in a market. Here we face a critical friction between our theoretical model
and the empirical implementation: While in theory the innovation opens up
a new market which is subject only to the future entry of competitors, in
reality a clear definition of the market for an innovative product is nearly
impossible. De facto a potential patentee faces established firms including
firms that were newly founded in this industry (our proxy variable NEW ).
These incumbents may be offering related products that compete with the
innovation although it is “new to the market”. Hence, a possible explanation
for the negative interaction term REL ∗NEW is that not only the potential
entrants profit from the disclosed information but also these incumbent firms.
Our variable NEW - which was intended as a proxy for market entry costs
- additionally reflects the number of firms operating in the market for the
innovative product. Obviously, whenever the number of these incumbent
firms is high more firms are able to access and use the information disclosed by
patenting and consequently the disclosure effect grows stronger. Given that
the relevancy of the disclosed information is high (REL=1), only a patent
of sufficient strength can overcompensate this negative disclosure effect in a
way that the strategy patent becomes preferable compared to the alternative
secrecy. Thus, when the relevancy of the disclosed information is high an
increase of the number of incumbent firms leads to a decreasing propensity
to patent.16
Concerning our control variables we find that larger firms, firms with an
increasing percentage of highly qualified employees, firms with an increasing
R&D intensity and firms with R&D cooperations have a higher propensity
to patent. Contrasting this, firms located in the Eastern part of Germany
have a lower probability to patent. Finally, firms mainly competing with
enterprizes outside Europe have a higher propensity to patent. As we can
only observe that firms have filed a patent but not where they filed it, there
may be two explanations for this finding. On the one hand it may be that
these firms file patents at their domestic patent office (i.e. the German or
European Patent Office) in order to secure their domestic markets from the
entry of foreign competitors. On the other hand, it may be that these firms
file their patents in their main competitors’ countries in order to secure their
market entry. Both effects may exist at the same time. This reasoning does
not contradict the non-significant effect of a main competitors’ base in the
16Note that the effect that the disclosure effect is stronger due to the existence of in-
cumbent firms which also profit from the disclosed information is not explicitly included
in the theoretical model.
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EU. The EU tries to establish a harmonization of the member countries’
patent laws which is not yet accomplished but is already in progress. As a
result, there is de facto no difference between the German and the European
product market with respect to patent protection.
Moreover, we conduct several robustness checks. First, we include the (lagged)
Herfindahl indices at the 3-digit NACE level taken from the statistics of the
German Monopoly Commission to reflect the competitive environment. This
measure replaces the firms’ perception about the number of competitors in
their relevant market. The advantage of the Herfindahl indices is that they
do not rely on subjective information. A caveat is that the industry clas-
sification may be too broadly defined so that it may not adequately reflect
the firms’ relevant markets. Second, we additionally include a measure for
an industry’s profitability since this may drive the threat as well as the ac-
tual entry of competitors. This variable is constructed by (lagged) growth
of industry sales. As before the information is taken from the statistics of
the German Monopoly Commission. The main problem with the data of the
German Monopoly Commission is that it only observes manufacturing. By
using this data we substantially reduce our sample. The respective tables
can be found in the Appendix. The previously described results remain the
same.
< Insert Table 3 about here. >
Finally, the theoretical model assumes that the innovator only has one inno-
vation and firms are balancing between patenting and keeping an invention
secret. In reality, firms often conduct several research projects at the same
time and choose different protection mechanisms for each invention. Further-
more, firms can rely on a wider range of means to protect their intellectual
property, e.g. trademarks, copyright. In contrast to the theoretical assump-
tions the MIP observes at the firm instead of the innovation level. Hence,
the respondents are supposed to answer for the whole company which means
that the IP protection strategy may take both forms, patenting and secrecy.
< Insert Table 4 about here. >
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In order to better reflect this, we further estimate bivariate probits for all of
the before mentioned estimation models. The results are displayed in Table
4 in the Appendix. With respect to our variables of interest we can state
that the results remain the same for the patenting equation. Secrecy is not
affected by the market entry costs or the impact of the disclosure effect.
Two effects may be responsible for this result: First, as long as no formal
protection mechanism is chosen firms rely per definition on secrecy to protect
their IP. Second, firms are not asked to reveal their protection strategy with
respect to the innovative product or process they launched (which is one
binding constraint for our sample definition). Looking at Figure ?? we can
see the effects of the interaction term REL ∗ NEW in the bivariate probit:
The impact of the number of newly established firms affects the propensity
to patent positively if the disclosure effect has no impact (= 0), whereas
there is only a slightly negative effect if the disclosure effect (= 1) has an
impact. Turning to the propensity to keep secret market entry costs seem to
have a slightly positive impact if the disclosure effect has an impact, i.e. an
increasing number of newly founded firms combined with a strong disclosure
effect favors firms’ decision to keep inventions secret. This robustness check
further strengthens our previous results regarding the effect of the disclosure
effect and market entry costs on the propensity to patent.
< Insert Figure ?? about here. >
Regarding the control variables we find a similar pattern for patenting and
secrecy: larger firms, firms with a higher share of qualified employees, firms
located in Western Germany and firms having R&D cooperations tend to
increase the propensity for both protection mechanisms. Those similarities
can be explained by the pattern of IP protection in the sample: More than
36% of the firms state that they use both patenting and secrecy, one third
only uses alternative protection mechanisms like trademarks and copyrights
and only 30% use either patenting or secrecy. Hence, the results may be
driven by the substantial overlap of the patenting and secrecy strategy. Firms
with a higher R&D intensity show a positive significant effect with respect
to their propensity to patent whereas there is no effect on the propensity
to keep the invention secret. Regarding the regional dimension of the firms’
relevant market, we find different effects for secrecy and patenting: as before,
a propensity to patent responds positively if the firm predominantly operates
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in market outside the EU and Germany whereas the propensity to keep secret
is positively affected by the fact that the firm operates on the EU level
compared to the German level.
4 Concluding Remarks
Our aim was to provide a framework in which the decision of an innovator be-
tween a patent and secrecy could be analyzed in the light of a varying impact
of the relevancy of the disclosed information for the patentee’s competitors.
To capture the positive and negative effects of patenting we introduced the
strategic protection decision of an innovator into a model of horizontally dif-
ferentiated products. As here market entry costs are decisive for the number
of firms which are able to enter, the impact of the disclosure effect could be
substantiated as a decrease of initial market entry costs. Our main theoret-
ical results are: Either the influence of the disclosure effect is weak so that
if the innovator patents the number of firms able to enter the market is left
unchanged, or the impact of the disclosure effect is strong so that the number
of firms increases if the innovator patents. Whenever the disclosure effect has
no impact, the patenting decision is solely driven by the protective effect –
the broader a patent is, the higher is the innovator’s propensity to patent.
Other than this, whenever the disclosure effect has an impact, we find that
the propensity to patent decreases.
The empirical investigation of our three predictions derived from the theo-
retical model supports our theoretical findings. The existence of a disclosure
effect has a substantial impact on the propensity to patent. Whenever the
negative effect of patenting gains weight due to a high relevancy of the dis-
closed information for competitors, the propensity to patent decreases. In
empirical terms we capture this by including an interaction term consisting
of a measure for the impact of the disclosure effect and the market entry
costs. Regarding the overall effect of market entry costs we reject our hy-
pothesis that the prevailing effect of increasing market entry costs on the
propensity to patent is negative which would be in line with economic in-
tuition. The results regarding the threat of entry supports the theoretically
derived countervailing effect that increasing market entry costs mitigate the
disclosure effect. Hence when the natural barriers to market entry increase,
it does not become obsolete to establish own, costly entry barriers and thus
the propensity to patent increases.
The main theoretical and empirical result of this paper is that the disclo-
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sure effect of patenting plays a substantial in a firm’s patenting decision.
Although the disclosure effect is oftentimes neglected particularly in the em-
pirical literature this paper shows that firms are balancing the protective and
disclosure effect of patenting and only decide to patent if the protective effect
overcompensates the disclosure effect.
This finding also has a policy dimension. If policymakers decide to imple-
ment some changes to patent law which would result in strengthening the
disclosure effect of patenting, e.g. by implementing or extending a research
use exemption, such actions should take into account that this could cause an
increasing reluctance of firms to patent. Hence, more newly created knowl-
edge would be kept secret. Whether this may have further detrimental effects
on the economy’s overall innovativeness and future productivity is subject to
further research.
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Figure 2: Firms’ locations with a patent, Nφ = 4
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Figure 3: Critical thresholds of market entry costs
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Figure 4: Alternative profits of the innovator with a patent/secrecy
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Figure 5: Interaction of disclosure effect and number of newly founded firms
Note: Average predictions. Source: MIP 2005, author’s calculations.
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6 Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
patent 0.437 0.497 0 1
secrecy 0.593 0.492 0 1
low threat of entry 0.897 0.303 0 1
log(newly founded firms) 6.012 1.856 0.000 10.467
relevancy 0.687 0.464 0 1
large number of firms 0.158 0.365 0 1
log(employees) 4.304 1.680 0 9.077
human capital 0.244 0.257 0.000 1.000
R&D intensity 0.065 0.274 0.000 6.427
capital intensity 0.110 0.277 0.000 4.554
EU 0.582 0.494 0 1
non EU 0.409 0.492 0 1
customer power 0.302 0.459 0 1
cooperation 0.370 0.483 0 1
east 0.318 0.466 0 1
No. of observation 799
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Table 2: Results of the Patenting Decision Estima-
tion
Marginal Effect Marginal Effect
(Standard Error) (Standard Error)
relevancy 0.012 -0.020
(0.048) (0.048)
low threat of entry 0.174**
(0.075)
REL * TOE -0.434***
(0.162)
log(newly founded firms) 0.012
(0.013)
REL * NEW -0.041**
(0.019)
large number of firms -0.083 -0.100
(0.064) (0.064)
log(employees) 0.113*** 0.118***
(0.016) (0.016)
human capital 0.252** 0.243*
(0.125) (0.125)
R&D intensity 1.452*** 1.404***
(0.305) (0.294)
capital intensity -0.191* -0.211*
(0.112) (0.123)
EU 0.061 0.075
(0.052) (0.054)
non EU 0.102** 0.096*
(0.050) (0.051)
customer power -0.058 -0.052
(0.049) (0.049)
cooperation 0.244*** 0.243***
(0.045) (0.045)
east -0.107** -0.098**
(0.050) (0.049)
industry dummies included included
Log likelihood -359.86 -361.27
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.343 0.340
χ2(all) 264.61*** 263.56***
χ2(ind) 44.53 *** 46.95***
Number of observations 799 799
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects of a probit estimation regarding the
determinants of the patenting decision. Marginal effects are calculated at the
sample means and that of the interaction term is obtained according to Ai and
Norton (2003). Standard errors are calculated with the delta method.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies.
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Table 3: Results of the Patenting Decision Estimation
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
relevancy 0.032 0.033 0.001 -0.000
(0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063)
low threat of entry 0.179* 0.182*
(0.106) (0.107)
REL * TOE -0.522** -0.526**
(0.239) (0.240)
log(newly founded firms) -0.019 -0.018
(0.021) (0.021)
REL * NEW -0.079*** -0.081***
(0.023) (0.023)
profitability -0.200 -0.189
(0.493) (0.502)
Herfindahl -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(employees) 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.173*** 0.173***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
human capital 0.053 0.057 0.044 0.048
(0.193) (0.196) (0.187) (0.188)
R&D intensity 2.643*** 2.642*** 2.711*** 2.709***
(0.613) (0.613) (0.588) (0.588)
capital intensity 0.032 0.035 -0.081 -0.078
(0.172) (0.173) (0.183) (0.184)
EU 0.026 0.026 0.037 0.037
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
non EU 0.098 0.100 0.090 0.092
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
customer power -0.032 -0.034 -0.025 -0.027
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
cooperation 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.222***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
east -0.067 -0.064 -0.061 -0.060
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
industry dummies included included included included
Log likelihood -229.78 -229.71 -229.80 -229.73
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.320
χ2(all) 149.92*** 150.95*** 156.89*** 158.58***
χ2(ind) 22.11*** 22.20*** 21.96*** 22.07***
Number of observations 488 488 488 488
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects of a probit estimation regarding the determinants of the patent-
ing decision. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means and that of the interaction term is
obtained according to Ai and Norton (2003). Standard errors are calculated with the delta method.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies.
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Table 4: Bivariate probit: patenting vs. secrecy
Patenting Secrecy Patenting Secrecy
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
relevancy 0.004 -0.045 -0.029 -0.039
(0.048) (0.043) (0,047) (0.043)
low threat of entry 0.178** -0.017
(0.076) (0.067)
log(newly founded firms) 0.011 0.008
(0.012) (0.012)
large number of firms -0.075 -0.075 -0.093 -0.077
(0.064) (0.053) (0.065) (0.052)
log(employees) 0.110*** 0.081*** 0.115*** 0.081***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
human capital 0.240* 0.479*** 0.228* 0.474***
(0.125) (0.105) (0.125) (0.105)
R&D intensity 1.435*** 0.328 1.387*** 0.339
(0.300) (0.211) (0.289) (0.215)
capital intensity -0.209* -0.209* -0.236* -0.191*
(0.120) (0.112) (0.132) (0.104)
EU 0.064 0.156*** 0.082 0.156***
(0.053) (0.059) (0.053) (0.049)
non EU 0.110** -0.014 0.102** -0.013
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049)
customer power -0.054 0.017 -0.047 0.017
(0.048) (0.044) (0.049) (0.044)
cooperation 0.241*** 0.194*** 0.241*** 0.196***
(0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.042)
east -0.118** -0.086** -0.109** -0.085
(0.049) (0.042) (0.049) (0.043)
industry dummies included included included included
Log likelihood -765.20 -767.77
ρ 0.460*** 0.454***
χ2(all) 369.95*** 368.54***
χ2(ind) 59.72*** 61.98
Number of observations 799 799
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects of a bivariate probit estimation regarding
the determinants of the decision to patent and to keep secret. Marginal effects are
calculated at the sample means. Standard errors are calculated with the delta method.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies.
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